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Previous papers have mentioned various alternative powerplants that could be 
considered for future aviation use; among these, the turboprop (TP). While turboprops 
should not be the major part of this workshop, for completeness I will summarize the 
content of the GATE turboprop studies that were completed two years ago. Those studies 
were initiated not wi th the intent of supplanting some of the reciprocating powerplants 
that we have today but rather of defining the best opportunity for small turbine power 
plants. The GATE studies suggested that the 300-600 horsepower range was best for small 
turboprop engines. 
As everyone knows, turbine powerplants are conventional in the large aircraft 
arena and, unlike the other engine candidates, the challenge is to develop fuel-
efficient small ones at reciprocating engine prices. While some advantages (e.g., 
reliabili ty, low maintenance, vibration-free operation, jet fuel) are relatively 
easily realized, engine cost and fuel inefficiency are problems. The main theme, then, 
of the GATE studies was one of reducing the manufacturing costs of small turbine engines 
without sacrificing the advantages. 
Figure 1 shows the approaches that were investigated by the four study teams 
involved. Mainly they chose to simplify the engine: one rather than two centrifugal 
compressors, and one radial turbine rather than three turbine stages. 
Another approach involved new manufacturing technology; ways of manufacturing 
small parts that are reasonably accurate and yield reasonable performance (not ultimate 
performance) but are substantially lower in cost. An example is making almost finished 
parts in one piece using powder metal techniques. The compressor might be manufactured 
that way. Another example is making small, cooled radial turbines with laminated 
sheets of super-alloy, powdered material, that have the cooling holes photo-etched into 
them. 
When all the technology studies were done and the accompanying market analyses 
were complete, the conclusion was that it is indeed possible to reduce the cost of 
turbine engines by a factor of 3 using low-cost manufacturing techniques and increased 
production rates. In the interest of reducing engine cost, some performance was 
sacrificed. Yet we ended up with about a 20 percent predicted improvement in SFC over 
current technology turboprops. However, even this level of improvement does not match 
the low SFC of reciprocating powerplants--particularly those advanced concepts 
described earlier. The 20 percent better SFC and much lower weight of a turboprop does 
mean that if such a powerplant were installed in a resized small airplane, one could 
save between 10 and 30 percent fuel relative to existing recip engines, depending on 
different mission and airplane combinations. This is shown in Figure 2. The price of 
the aircraft would go down about 15 percent in the case of a high powered single, or 25 
percent in the case of a normal size twin. The operating costs would decrease about 10 
percent in the case of the single, and as much as 35 percent in the case of the twin. 
The turbine was not judged to be competitive in very small sizes such as the 140 SHP 
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required for a turboprop version of a Cessna 172. It just simply could not achieve the 
performance required in that size category. So the advanced turboprop would only be a 
candidate for the higher end of the singles market and the mUlti-engine twins. These 
results, comparing advanced turboprops with current recip engines, are only part of the 
story of course. Comparison with the various hypothetical advanced internal combustion 
engines is equally important and such comp~risons were made in a NASA in-house 
analysis. * Results showed the turboprop to be competitive only above 300 SHP. Above 
300 SHP, all of these candidates are worthy of pursuit. 
If eventually it turned out that the turboprop was the only viable solution, one 
might then ask "What would that do to the fuel situation?" I think that is a legitimate 
"what if" type question. The shaded portion of Figure 3 shows the number of engines 
that are sub;ect to turbinization. In 1979, turboprops accounted for about 1/20th of 
the production of all aviation engines. Most of the piston engines, of course, were 
produced around the 200-300 horsepower size. The potential of a hypothetical GATE-
technology turbine engine is such that it could replace about 30 percent of piston 
engIne production. One can conclude, therefore, that the alternative IC engines are 
complementary in nature to the advanced turboprop. However, the question is "What will 
happen in the absence of alternative IC engines?" Figure 4 shows our projections. The 
current G/A turbine engines, although very small in number, actually consume more fuel 
than avgas-powered aircraft do. Even wi thout a GATE Program, that trend is continuing 
such that in several years we expect that avgas will represent only about 35 percent of 
the total general aviation fuel consumption. If there were a GATE turboprop in the 
future, it would occupy some of the marketplace and eventually would reduce the avgas 
portion of the total market to something on the order of 25 pe'rcent. Of course, these 
estimates are very rough. 
We heard previous comments concerning flying piston airplanes into airports where 
they do not have avgas. The other side of the coin is "What happens if you take a 
turbine-powered aircraft into one of the small, general aviation airports and you don't 
find turbine fuel?" That would become an even more interesting question if the GATE 
Program were actually to be implemented and become successful. The problems 
encountered are summarized in Figure 5 and arise from the lead in the gasoline. Lead 
forms deposits in the combustor. These are severe with extensive and continuous use of 
leaded avgas in turbine engines. Tests have also shown intergranular metal attack of 
the hot turbine parts, which is detrimental to the life of those parts. Also, because 
of the volatility, low boiling point, and flammability limits of avgas, turbine engines 
are likely to suffer some flight envelope and starting envelope restrictions. These 
restrictions are not judged to be serious if one were to just use this fuel on an 
emergency basis. And lastly, if an aircraft does not have an onboard fuel boost pump 
it would likely suffer vapor lock or fuel pump cavitation problems. But most of the 
turbine-powered aircraft, of course, do have boost pumps. 
The real show-stopper is the lead. If you got the lead out, there's no reason you 
couldn't use avgas in turbine engines today. The current status, then, is that turbine 
engines can use avgas on an emergency basis. They are certified to do so, in fact, for 
between 6 and 150 hours per TBO. You can sometimes even use avgas on a semi-continuous 
basis. For example, to cold start the Allison 250 small engine when Jet B is not 
available, avgas is allowed in a one-to-two mixture with Jet A. In fact, that procedure 
*Wickenheiser, T. J., et. al: Comparisons of Four Alternative Powerplant Types 
for Future General Aviation Aircraft. NASA TM 81584, Oct. 1980. 
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is recommended below 40oF. Avgas use usually requires an adjustment of the fuel 
control. For example, the pilot may open a cowl access door and reset a fuel density 
knob. In most cases it's not a difficult task. In days past, the fuel control systems 
have been limited in their capability to tolerate avgas when starting engines or for 
accommodating throttle bursts. The modern electronic systems can tolerate the 
acceleration schedule of turbine engines using avgas considerably better than the past 
systems. So the real show-stopper, to say it again, happens to be lead. 
Finally, NASA has recently initiated combustor research for small turbine engines 
that addresses the capability to use the broad specification fuels we anticipate in the 
future. And I would add a recommendation that those studies be broadened into 
consideration of the possible use of avgas as well. 
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DESIGN SIMPLICITY 
NET SHAPE INTEGRAL COMPONENTS 
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Figure 1. - GATE approaches to low cost. 
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Figure 3. - Approximate engine sales in General 
Aviation, 1979. Data for U.S. manu-
facturers only, spares excluded. 
165 
80 
--
----
-
-
.--
60 
% TOTAL ~ G.A. FUEL 40 AVGAS 
1::::_ W/O GATE 
--
--
---20 --
0 
YEAR 
Figure 4. - Potential impact on General 
Aviation fuel. 
TURBINE ENGINE TOLERANCE TO AVGAS 
PROBLEM 
• Forms lead deposits in combustor 
WITH GATE 
• Intergranular metal attack of combustor and turbine by lead 
• Shrinks flight and ignition envelopes (boiling/flammability) 
• Requires fuel boost pump to prevent cavitation (usually on board ) 
CURRENT STATUS 
• Acceptable for emergency use (6 - 150 hr per TBO period) 
• Sometimes permitted for semi-continuous use, e.g.,: 
- 250 gal. per fOO hr 
- Mixed with Jet A (f: 2 ) for cold weather 
• Usually requires density adjustment on fuel control 
• Modern electronic fuel control systems accommodate AVGAS 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
• Combustor research aimed at heavy end of broad - spec fuels 
• Recommend consideration of AVGAS as well 
Figure 5. 
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